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Abstract: In this paper, I analyse EE I 6, where Aristotle pre-
sented a famous methodological digression. Many interpreters 
have taken this chapter as advocating a dialectical procedure of 
enquiry. My claim is that Aristotle does not keep a dialectical 
attitude towards endoxa or phainomena in this chapter. In order 
to accomplish my goal, I shall show that EE I 6 does not pro-
vide enough evidence for the dialectical construal of it, and that 
this construal, in turn, hangs on some assumptions brought out 
from other Aristotelian works (EN and Top.), which do not pro-
vide good evidence either. By the examination of these assump-
tions, I intend to show that Aristotle is not carrying out any sort 
of dialectic, especially dialectic conceived as conceptual analysis 
seeking to save phainomena or endoxa.
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Introduction
In the last few decades, many scholars have pro-
posed some sort of revival of Aristotle’s dialectic1. $is 
renewed interest in the Aristotelian dialectic placed 
the Topics as a work worth of close scrutiny, especially 
the %rst two chapters of book I, where Aristotle o&ers 
some details about the concept of endoxa and of di-
alectical syllogism. In Top. I 12, Aristotle makes very 
clear that endoxa are used as premises of any dialecti-
cal syllogism. In spite of this clear statement on the en-
doxicality of dialectical premises, Top. I 1 is still vague 
and many ways of construing Aristotle’s positions are 
possible. Some interpreters have understood that Top. 
I supplies Aristotelian philosophy a method of in-
quiry3 inasmuch as dialectic is an argumentative activ-
ity which proceeds from endoxa, and endoxa are pre-
sented along these lines: “$ose [things] are acceptable 
[endoxa], on the other hand, which seem so to every-
one, or to most people, or to the wise – to all of them, 
or to most, or to the most famous and esteemed.” (Top. 
I 1 100b21-23)4. Endoxa are presented under a crite-
rion that establishes them as opinions which everyone 
or some representative group of people are prone to 
accept. Now, if all it takes for an argument to be dia-
lectical is to have endoxa as premises, all arguments 
Aristotle deploys using his predecessor philosophers’ 
opinions or some reputable opinion widely shared are 
candidates to be dialectical arguments. 
Considering this picture, some interpreters have 
been defending that dialectical arguments are spread 
all over Aristotle’s works and that they are an impor-
tant aspect of his philosophical enquiry. Nonetheless, 
it is not in the Topics where they %nd how dialectical 
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enquiry is detailed. One very important text claimed 
to develop Aristotelian conception of dialectical en-
quiry is EE I 6 1216b26-35. In what follows, I shall 
present a dialectical construal of this text and then 
analyse the assumptions made by it. My claim is that 
a dialectical construal of this passage is not a viable 
one since it does not %t well in the context where it is 
located, and has no support of other important text 
held as elaborating on the dialectical enquiry in the 
clearest way, namely EN VII I 1045a2-75. 
A dialectical construal of EE I 6 1216b26-35
A*er presenting the overall purpose of the trea-
tise and some common conceptions of happiness, 
Aristotle opens EE I 6 by detailing a sort of method 
to be followed in his enquiry. $e text runs like this: 
T1: (i) We must try, by argument [διὰ τῶν λόγων], 
to reach a convincing conclusion on all these ques-
tions, (ii) using, as testimony and by way of example, 
what appears to be the case [φαινομένοις]. (iii) For 
it would be best if everyone should turn out to agree 
[πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας] 
with what we are going to say; (iv) if not that, that 
they should all agree in a way and will agree a*er a 
change of mind [εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ 
μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν·]; for [γὰρ] each man 
has something of his own to contribute to the %nding 
of the truth, and it is from such (starting-points) that 
we must demonstrate (δεικνύναι): (v) beginning with 
things that are correctly said, but not clearly, (ek gar 
tōn alēthōs men legomenōn ou saphōs de) as we pro-
ceed we shall come to express them clearly, with what 
is more perspicuous at each stage superseding what is 
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customarily expressed in a confused fashion (EE I 6 
1216b 26-35)6.
$e dialectical construal I am depicting here is 
strongly based on dialectic taken as conceptual analy-
sis, in which proceeding by means of solving obscure 
language or poor formulation of endoxic propositions 
is the main feature of dialectical enquiry7. Nonethe-
less, most of my points target any sort of dialectical 
enquiry not con%ned within the limits of the regulat-
ed debate Aristotle describes in Topics VIII8. 
Interpretations of this sort hang on several assump-
tions. By itself, EE does not supply dialectical inter-
preters all the evidence they need. $ere are, at least, 
%ve assumptions they need to import from di&erent 
works to support their dialectical reading of T1. 
A1 – ‘phainomena’ means ‘endoxa’ 
$e term ‘endoxa’ does not appear in T1 and this 
text does not make manifest that the term ‘phainome-
na’ is interchangeable with ‘endoxa’. Even if a dialecti-
cal interpreter does not concede the interchangeabil-
ity salva veritate between ‘phainomena’ and ‘endoxa’, 
she will be willing to accept that some phainomena are 
endoxa9. In order to support her claim, the dialectical 
interpreter would take as her strongest evidence the 
very famous text from EN VII 1 1145b2-7:
T2: “As in other cases, we must set out what appears true 
[τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα] about our subjects, and, having 
%rst raised the problems [πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας], thus 
display, if we can, all the views people hold [ἔνδοξα] about 
these ways of being a&ected, and if not, the larger part of 
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them, and the most authoritative; for if one can both resolve 
the dicult issues about a subject and leave people’s views 
on it undisturbed, it will have been clari%ed well enough.”10
$is passage has been interpreted as the most %ne-
grained description of the dialectical procedure in Ar-
istotle’s works. Accordingly, dialectical method would 
consist of a three-step argumentative strategy. Firstly, 
the enquirer should stablish all the relevant phainom-
ena regarding her subject matter. Next, she shall cre-
ate aporiai from endoxa. $irdly, she shall get ‘good 
enough’ proof if the examined endoxa rest undis-
turbed a*er the diaporia. $e sequel of T2 (EN VII 1 
1045b8-20) displays a number of opinions shared on 
akrasia saying that they are legomena, i.e., things said 
about akrasia. Owen’s (1986, p.240) inuential con-
strual of this sequel of T2 claims that the legomena are 
the phainomena about akrasia. Instead of being em-
pirical data, these phainomena are propositions held 
by a representative group of people or “conceptual 
structure revealed by language” (Owen, 1986, p.240). 
By being so, each of these phainomena is a legomenon 
that instantiates an endoxon, since endoxa are said to 
be what appear to everyone, or to most people, or to 
the wise. $us, ‘phainomena’ in the %rst step of the 
method displayed in T2, and ‘endoxa’ in the follow-
ing steps are taken as having the same referents. $ese 
terms refer to all the propositions enumerated in T2’s 
sequel. Hence, a dialectical interpreter does not need 
to be committed to a salva veritate interchangeability 
between ‘phainomena’ and ‘endoxa’; all she needs is 
that some phainomena instantiate endoxa, and that 
this occurs both in T1 and T2.
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$is being said, the purportedly dialectical proce-
dure of enquiry consists of, %rstly, setting the rele-
vant phainomena/endoxa. If there are inconsistencies 
within the set of relevant phainomena/endoxa, the 
enquirer needs, as the second step, to present these 
inconsistencies as aporiai. By means of some sort 
of conceptual analysis, it would be possible to sort 
out the inconsistencies and hopefully obtain ‘good 
enough’ proof, i.e., the consistency of the most au-
thoritative phainomena/endoxa. 
In T1’s step (ii), Aristotle says that phainomena 
consisting of testimonies and examples are the means 
to reach conviction through argument, which is the 
goal step (i) seeks. Now, as EN VII 1, EE I 6 does not 
clearly refer to empirical data. Rather, in T1, proposi-
tions are what seem to be at stake, and that most men 
know at least part of the truth about happiness. Con-
sequently, as T1 involves phainomena which seem to 
be endoxa (even if the term ‘endoxa’ is never used in 
it), dialectical interpreters can claim that T1 is a pro-
gram for dialectical enquiry11.
A2 – at least one ‘endoxon’ is at stake in EE I 6
If EE I 6 sets a programme for dialectical enquiry, then 
it needs to refer to some endoxa. $ese endoxa are pre-
cisely the bearers of something true each man has of his 
own, as stated in T1 (iv). What endoxa do they refer to? 
$e answer to this question is not simple, though. 
Aristotle, in the course of his endeavour to reach a 
clear de%nition of eudaimonia, mentions some com-
monly shared opinions about what eudaimonia is or 
what it consists of. In EE I 3 1214b28-31 he says that 
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not all opinions count the same. Whilst everybody 
seems to %nd an easy task to say what eudaimonia is 
and what it consists of (I 5 1215b15-18), some peo-
ple’s opinion will not be taken under scrutiny, since 
they are clearly wrong. 
$e opinions Aristotle holds as relevant to his en-
quiry on happiness consider happiness the greatest 
possible human good and that it is constituted of ei-
ther virtue, wisdom or pleasure, which respectively 
constitutes political life, philosophical life and life of 
enjoyment (EE I 1 1214a30-33, I 4 1215a32b-1)12. So, 
it is quite certain that there are some opinions held as 
relevant for Aristotle present in T1’s context, and, thus, 
the dialectical interpreter is supplied with endoxa nec-
essary to put the dialectical procedure at work. 
A3: ‘endoxa’ are the domain of dialectic and of 
dialectic only
A dialectical reading of EE I 6 needs to identify 
‘phainomena’ with ‘endoxa’ as shown in A1. $is 
identi%cation is a necessary condition for a dialectical 
reading of this text, but it is not a sucient condition. 
Another important element compounding the dialec-
tical reading is that endoxa are the domain of dialectic 
and dialectic only. $is is needed because if endoxa 
were not the domain of dialectic only, one could not 
arm that EE I 6 is dialectic without quali%cation. 
$us, if there would be another branch of knowledge 
or method of enquiry that has endoxa as its domain, 
there would be some indeterminacy about which 
branch of knowledge or method of enquiry would 
deal with the endoxa mentioned in A3. 
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In order to guarantee that endoxa are the domain of 
dialectic and dialectic only, one needs a much strong-
er claim that dialectical reasoning uses endoxa. One 
needs to be committed to a thesis according to which 
a reasoning is dialectical if and only if it uses endoxa. 
Now, evidence for this stronger claim is an Achilles’s 
heel for such a dialectical interpreter. 
Of course an alternative way to guarantee that 
phainomena in EE I 6 are endoxa, and that the meth-
odology there deployed is dialectical, is possible. All 
one needs to show is that EE I 6 advances a procedure 
backed by some evidence which clearly is identi%ed as 
dialectic. $e commonly deployed evidence, as pin-
pointed above, is EN VII 1 1145b2-7, which, in turn, 
depends on further evidence, since there is no clear 
mention in its context that it is dialectical. Again, the 
claim that this EN’s passage is proposing a dialectical 
procedure hangs on the assumption that the diaporia 
of endoxa is a sucient condition to identify an ar-
gumentative procedure as dialectical, since it uses en-
doxa. If this is so, the dialectical interpreter is caught 
over again by the same trap. 
To scape this trap, one might resort to the Top. I 2 
101a34-b3, where Aristotle says that inasmuch dialec-
tic more than anything else examines (exestatikē ousa) 
endoxa about any subject. $is is a more sophisticated 
move13 and I shall present this in A4. 
A4: dialectic is a method of enquiry whose pro-
cedure consists in the examination of endoxa. 
At the beginning of the Topics, Aristotle says that 
the goal of the treatise is to %nd a method which 
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would enable one to argue from endoxa (Top. I 1 
100a18-24) and that dialectical syllogisms have en-
doxa in its premises (Top. I 1 100a29-30). In addition 
to these passages, Aristotle arms that the treatise is 
also useful for philosophical sciences inasmuch as it 
would make one more capable of proceed through 
aporiai and that dialectic promotes some sort of exam 
of endoxa more than anything else: 
T3: It is useful in relation to the philosophical sciences 
because if we have the ability to go through the dicul-
ties (διαπορῆσαι) on either side we shall more readily 
discern the true as well as the false in any subject. 
Furthermore, it is useful in connection with the %rst of 
the starting-points about any individual science. For if 
we reason from the starting-points appropriate to the sci-
ence in question, it is impossible to make any statement 
about these (since these starting-points are the %rst of 
them all), and it is by means of what is acceptable about 
each [περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων] that it is necessary to discuss 
them. But this is unique, or at any rate most appropriate, 
to dialectic: for since its ability to examine [ἐξεταστικὴ] 
applies to the starting-points of all studies, it has a way to 
proceed. (Top. I 2 101a34-b3)
$is apparent features of dialectic in the Topics 
must square the procedures described in T1 and T2. 
$us, the exam referred to in T3 must somehow pick 
up the procedures the two ethical treatises describe. 
Furthermore, this exam must instantiate a kind of ar-
gument the Topics’ opening paragraph arms to be 
the goal it accounts for. 
Fernando Mendonça, 
‘Does Aristotle have a 
dialectical attitude in 
EE I 6? A negative an-
swer’, p. 161-190
170
nº 20, may-aug. 2017
A5: dialectical method is proli!c at least to the 
extent that it can produce agreement.
$is assumption is backed by the sentence intro-
duced by the ‘gar’ in T1’s line 31, which displays the 
reason why relevant people would agree with what is 
going to be said. What makes people agree with what 
they would not be willing to agree at %rst is some sort 
of change captured by the verb ‘metabibazomenoi’. 
Wood’s translation renders this verb as “to change 
minds”, option Smith (1997) and Inwood & Woolf 
(2013) subscribe to. 
In this way, it turns out that people would end up 
agreeing with what Aristotle says because they have 
their own conception of happiness which contains 
something of the truth about this subject. Presumably, 
these conceptions of happiness are the same as those 
relevant opinions referred to at the beginning of T1. If 
this is correct, then what is at stake is that happiness is 
in some way correctly said to be the greatest good to 
humans, and that it consists of a life of virtue, wisdom 
or pleasure. $ese opinions are the departure of the 
proof Aristotle seeks to o&er. 
Now, what does this change of minds and the clari-
%cation process of opinions have so as they should be 
taken as dialectic? Again, by itself, T1 does not supply 
us with neat evidence. $ey are taken as dialectical 
procedures only if some evidence is brought up from 
EN and Top. 
As shown above, EE’s methodological passage hangs 
on an assumption which rest on Top I 2, where dialectic 
is said to perform exams of endoxa. $is exam would 
Fernando Mendonça, 
‘Does Aristotle have 
a dialectical attitude 
in EE I 6? A negative 
answer’, p. 161-190
nº 20, may-aug. 2017
171
have as its outcome the change of minds of those peo-
ple who hold the initial set of endoxa concerning hap-
piness. $e occurrence of the rare verb ‘metabibazein’ 
in Aristotle’s work is used as evidence for a dialectical 
construal of T1. In addition to this occurrence in T1, 
this verb appears only in two other passages in Aristo-
tle’s work, both in the Topics. $e %rst passage is also 
found in Top. I 2, and reads like this: 
T4: And it is useful in relation to encounters because, once 
we have reckoned up the opinions of the public, we shall 
speak to them, not from the beliefs of others, but from 
their own beliefs, changing their minds (μεταβιβάζοντες) 
about anything they may seem to us not to have stated 
well. (Top. I 2 101a30-b34)
$is passage has some interpretative diculties of 
its own, as, for example, what kind of event instantiate 
the encounters. For my interests here, I do not need 
to scrutinize this passage. As for the encounters, I will 
take them as broadly referring to some sort of debate 
which is not under the constrains Aristotle provides 
for some sort of debates in Top. VIII. $us conceived, 
an encounter would be an event where some inter-
locutor skilled in dialectical debate meets one or some 
people which have not been instructed in this kind of 
dialectical debate. In this event, the dialectical educat-
ed partner would proceed an exam of her interlocu-
tor’s opinion such as she would be capable of showing 
that the set of opinions held by her interlocutor has 
at least one opinion not well stated. By showing this 
problem in the set of opinions held by her interlocutor, 
the dialectical educated partner would make the occa-
sion for her interlocutor to change her mind about the 
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problematic opinion(s). $en, dialectic would be used 
without the stricter constrains of the regulated debate 
displayed in Top. VIII and would have a much broader 
range of application, producing to other people the oc-
casion for their change of minds. Moreover, there is a 
dialectical way for changing minds, according to Top. 
VIII 11 161a30-3614, opposed to the contentious way.
Now, our dialectical interpreter would propose 
reading T1 and T4 together as the latter providing 
support for the former. $en, she might claim that 
what is at stake in T1 is a straightforwardly hands-on 
application of the dialectical procedure laid out in T4. 
Accordingly, Aristotle would, then, be taken as saying 
that the method in T1 is a program for the exam of the 
relevant endoxa presented in the preceding chapters 
of EE I 6. $ese endoxa, having been said to be true, 
but not clear15, what would amount to ‘not to have 
stated well’ in T4’s line 33, would emerge signi%cantly 
clearer as the outcome of dialectical procedure. $e 
not well-stated opinion would convey some part of 
the truth, but its language is supposedly misleading. 
If T1 and T4 get support from T2, our dialectical 
interpreter can propose the following picture: she 
takes phainomena in T1 and T2 as meaning endoxa, 
and those endoxa are true propositions with some 
kind of problem in their language, so that they are un-
clear or not well-stated, and Aristotle’s procedure is 
taken as a conceptual analysis which will deliver the 
same endoxa, or, at least, the most authoritative of 
them, in much clearer propositions. Having this set of 
endoxa clari%ed, the proponents of these endoxa will 
change their minds as the result of the procedure this 
conceptual analysis consists of. 
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My challenging points
$e kind of dialectical construal I have presented 
above was very inuential, but it is being critically dis-
cussed nowadays. For instance, D. Frede (2012) dis-
cussed the endoxic method, as she named, following 
Kraut (2006), the method displayed in T2, and con-
cludes that the method in T2 is not a methodological 
pattern Aristotle uses o*en. She says:
$e explanation of why the endoxic method as deployed 
in EN 7. 1-2 is rarely used in Aristotle does not mean to 
suggest that its rarity is due to the fact that he does not 
encounter confusions concerning central conceptions 
elsewhere. Aristotle could have used such a method of 
clari%cation, and in fact may have employed it for himself 
wherever he encountered problems of comparable com-
plexity. But, as a matter of fact, in his texts as far as we 
have them, most of the time he prefers to present his own 
well-worked-out points of view without a detour via a list 
of ‘reputable views’ and the problems involved in them. 
(FREDE, 2012, p.211-212)
She also notes that the frequent usage of expressions 
like ‘it appears’, ‘it seems’ or ‘it is plausible’ by Aristo-
tle rests on a common usage of cautionary language in 
philosophy rather than some speci%c feature of Aristo-
telian philosophy appealing to widely shared opinions 
(Frede, 2012, p.213). Another recent and noteworthy 
paper questioning dialectical reading of one of the texts 
we are dealing with here, namely, our T1, is Karbowski’s 
(2015), where he, quite compellingly, shows that in the 
EE I 6 – II 1 phainomena are not restricted to endoxa 
and that in this set of chapters, the examples assumed as 
phainomena play quite a di&erent argumentative role: 
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they are the basis for Aristotle to illustrate or obtain 
evidence for premises of his argument (Karbowski, 
2015, p.215-216), which is essentially deductive, and 
not a kind of conceptual analysis. He says: 
$is essential aporetic slant to the endoxic method [dis-
played in EN VII 1] constitutes another substantial di&e-
rence between it and the Eudemian method. In contrast 
to the former method, puzzle-raising is not an integral 
part of the latter method. $e Eudemian method is es-
sentially deductive; it arrives at its ‘clearer’ de%nitions of 
ethical subjects by constructing deductive arguments, 
using the phainomena as witnesses and examples for its 
premisses, not by raising and solving puzzles. Aristotle 
never says that clarity about happiness must be reached 
by means of puzzles in EE I.6; the word ‘puzzle’ (aporia) 
or the corresponding verb is not even mentioned in that 
chapter. (KARBOWSKI, 2015, p.217).
Karbowski’s paper thoroughly covers the appli-
cation of the method displayed in T1 in the follow-
ing chapters of EE, namely, I7– II1. His strategy is to 
show that Aristotle deploys in these chapters argu-
ments that can hardly be considered as dialectic. My 
claim is similar: I intend to show that EE I 6 does not 
propose a dialectical program as well, but I want to 
focus on undermining the assumptions I enumerate 
above and showing that the EE I 6’s previous chapters 
do not envisage endoxa as some sort of propositions 
badly stated and, thus, unclear, which will emerge 
clear a*er a dialectical exam. Rather, those endoxa 
are seen as de%nitely insucient for a de%nition of 
happiness on the basis of empirical arguments, hence, 
the reason why Aristotle is not bound by a sort of 
conceptual analysis. 
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$e %rst assumption described above identi%es 
‘phainomena’ with ‘endoxa’, if not in every possible oc-
currence of these terms, at least it does that in T1 and 
T2. I agree with Karbowski (2015) indicating that en-
doxa is only part of the material used as phainomena 
in the following chapters of EE I 6. In those chapters, 
Aristotle is happy to deploy, as it were, inductive argu-
ment which does not lie on endoxa, for instance, when 
he concludes that from some empirical evidence that 
some things like cloak, boat and house each have its 
own function, then the soul also has its own function 
(EE II 1 1218b37-1219a5). $is argumentative pattern 
is far di&erent from the conceptual analysis vindicat-
ed in T2, according to the dialectical interpreter, and 
proposed to be a model for the program set in T1. 
Now, it is reasonable to concede that, in some con-
texts, Aristotle is willing to accept that some phain-
omena are endoxa. It is also reasonable to concede 
that A2 is, in fact, true: there is at least one endoxon 
at stake in T1. A quick look at EE I 1-5 gives us opin-
ions shared by wise men, like that happiness consists 
of pleasure, virtue or wisdom (e.g. EE I 1 1214a30-33), 
which are easily agreed to be endoxa. But does Aris-
totle hold some dialectical attitude toward them? $at 
is, is Aristotle willing to save the phainomena/endoxa 
by conceptual analysis in the way the dialectical inter-
preters understand T2 to be prescribing? 
A closer look to EE I 1-5 might give us some clues 
about how Aristotle deals with those opinions which 
might be reasonably taken as endoxa. As mentioned 
above, Aristotle does not count every opinion equal-
ly as endoxa. About happiness, everybody thinks 
of themselves as capable of opining on this subject. 
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Aristotle, however, is clear: “Similarly, neither need 
we examine the views of the many; they speak in an 
unre#ective way on almost any topic, most of all when 
they speak about this; only the opinions of the wise – 
on this subject at least – should be examined.” (cf. EE 
I 3 1214b34–1215a2 – emphasis is mine). EE seems 
to have a much stricter attitude towards accepting 
an opinion as relevant than the attitude in the Topics 
towards assuming relevant endoxa for the dialectical 
debate. $is di&erence is quite important and should 
not be overlooked. It represents a problem for the dia-
lectical interpreter as the sentence which presents en-
doxa in Top. I 1 100b 21-23 makes undoubtedly clear 
that the opinions of most people do count in dialecti-
cal argumentation16. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, Aristotle 
does not show in EE I 1-5 the attitude towards rel-
evant opinions expected in a dialectical construal of 
T1 as following the conceptual analysis program of 
T2. In the same manner as in the EN, in the EE (I 2 
1214b11-17) Aristotle assumes that happiness means 
a good life directed toward and organized by an ulti-
mate goal17. $e enquiry Aristotle undertakes seeks 
to narrow down this assumption in order to get a bet-
ter understanding of what happiness is and what it 
consists of. 
$ere are some opinions about what happiness con-
sists of which are present throughout EE 1-5. $ese 
opinions hold happiness as a life organized either by 
pleasure, or virtue, or wisdom, or a blend of them. For 
Aristotle, what is controversial is not whether a happy 
life has or might have pleasure, virtue or wisdom, or 
all of them in some proportion. Rather, the controversy 
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is whether they are what happiness consists of, since it 
is not enough for something to be considered happi-
ness to be a sine qua non condition for happiness (EE 
I 2 1214b 15-27). So, on the one hand, we have a set 
of opinions which holds pleasure, wisdom or virtue as 
what constitute happiness, on the other hand, Aristotle 
wants to investigate if wisdom, virtue and pleasure are 
merely necessary conditions for happiness, since x be-
ing a necessary condition for something does not mean 
that this thing consists of x. Aristotle gives as an exam-
ple that breathing is a necessary condition of any good 
or bad that happens to us, since no good or bad would 
a&ect us if we could not breath. Notwithstanding, we 
would not say that breathing plays any major role in 
being good or bad, even less, would we say that it con-
stitutes being good or bad (1214b19-22). 
Having set up this picture, Aristotle says: “It is these 
opinions, then, that it is right for us to investigate; for 
the refutation of those who dispute a certain position 
is a demonstration of the opposing view.” (I 3 1215a5-
7). What opinions are these? $e context gives us that 
these opinions are the ones wise men hold. Consider-
ing that Aristotle dismisses the opinions of the many, 
and truly examines the opinions that happiness con-
sists of pleasure, or wisdom, or virtue, these are the 
right opinions to investigate on the aporiai concern-
ing the best life (1215a 3-5). Now, we have Aristotle 
mentioning in the same context both opinions or en-
doxa and an investigation which proceeds through 
aporiai, suggesting that the problem is solved when 
some opinion is refuted. Given the dialectical inter-
pretation of T1 and T2, wouldn’t we be in front of a 
dialectical procedure18? It appears that we have im-
portant similarities between what Aristotle says in EE 
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I 3 and what he says in T1 and T2 (according to the 
dialectical interpreter). 
I do not think that these appearances are true, 
though. Firstly, it seems to me quite unlikely that 
Aristotle were saying that the refutation of any of the 
three opinions about what constitutes happiness is 
the demonstration of the opposing view of each of 
these opinions, and is also unlikely he were proposing 
that the refutation of one or two of these opinions is 
the demonstration of the remaining. Aristotle is not 
willing to refute that pleasure, wisdom or virtue are 
necessary conditions to happiness or constitute hap-
piness and, then, to propose their opposing states or 
a&ections as playing these roles. As a matter of fact, 
pleasure, wisdom and virtue will be part of Aristotle’s 
enquiry until he gets the de%nition of happiness in EE 
II 1. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Aristotle 
were proposing that the refutation of one or two of 
those opinions are the demonstration of the remain-
ing. $e refutation of the opinions according to which 
happiness is virtue or pleasure does not entail that it 
is wisdom, and mutatis mutandis the same conclusion 
obtains for all combination of opinions refuted. So, 
this procedure simply does not go through without a 
complementary premise guaranteeing that there are 
these three opinions and only these three. But there 
is no clue for thinking that it is what Aristotle is com-
mitted to here.
It seems much more likely that Aristotle is examin-
ing not each one of those opinions, but the aporia he 
raises concerning their being mere necessary condi-
tions to happiness or their being what happiness con-
sists of. If this is so, we have what Aristotle wanted in 
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the %rst place, that is, an aporia in which the refuta-
tion of one side is the demonstration of the other side. 
So, if Aristotle is seeking the de%nition of happiness, 
then he will need to %nd what constitutes happiness 
essentially, and not merely its necessary conditions. 
He has assumed that pleasure, wisdom and virtue 
have good credentials as part of the happy life. What 
Aristotle needs to %nd out is whether their presence is 
what makes one’s life happy. If he gets a negative an-
swer, then he will have demonstrated that they are no 
more than important necessary conditions. 
Aristotle proceeds a quick exam of these opinions 
in EE I 5. He %rstly remarks that some lives, despite 
being full of pleasures, would not be held as the best 
lives19. He goes as far as to say that non-existence is 
preferable to some lives dedicated to pleasures that 
are not good at all (I 5 1215b25-26). If there are lives 
dedicated to pleasure which are not good lives, and 
happiness is the best life, then pleasure is not what 
happiness consists of.
As for virtue, Aristotle remarks a fact to refute the 
opinion that virtue constitutes the best life. Some 
people honestly live a virtuous life, but some, like 
most politicians, seek reputation by acting virtuous-
ly. $eir goal is not, then, to be virtuous, but to earn 
money or personal advantages (EE I 5 1216a 19-27). 
$is is enough for Aristotle to conclude that a life of 
virtue might not be happy, since virtue might not be 
an end in itself. 
About wisdom, Aristotle carries out a similar pro-
cedure. In 1216b15-25, Aristotle says that the elder 
Socrates thought that the end (telos) is the knowledge 
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of virtue, hence, why he asked for the de%nition of the 
speci%c virtues. Accordingly, in the same way as one 
becomes a geometer or a builder when she learns ge-
ometry or building, one would be virtuous inasmuch as 
she knows virtue. Aristotle, however, does not %nd this 
approach %ts the demands of productive sciences on the 
basis that, despite valuable knowledge, the knowledge 
of virtue is not what he aims at, but how to be happy. So, 
someone might know what virtue is and nonetheless 
not be virtuous. It seems that Aristotle’s point is that 
knowledge of ethical matters is highly regarded, but 
this is not what he is searching. He wants an account 
of happiness which enables one to be happy20. $en, he 
seeks an account of happiness which makes clear what 
it is and what it consists of, being that the goal of the 
enquiry Aristotle undertakes in the EE21.
If this is right, Aristotle has shown that pleasure, 
wisdom and virtue simpliciter are not the end which 
makes life happy. $ey might and they do play a major 
role in a happy life but they are not what happiness is 
or consists of. None of the arguments he deploys, and 
this is important for my goal, are based on any kind 
conceptual analysis. $ere is no conceptual confusion 
to be dealt with, or obscure language to be clari%ed 
in any of the opinions analysed. Arguably, Aristotle 
carries out the refutation of happiness consisting in 
virtue, wisdom or pleasure on the basis of empirical 
facts used as instances which contradict the relevant 
opinions. $en, Aristotle does not show the attitude ex-
pected for a dialectical treatment based on conceptual 
analysis of endoxa. Aristotle does not regard the opin-
ions he analyses as though they had true propositional 
content but were poorly formulated. To the contrary, 
Aristotle’s preliminary approach to them shows that 
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they cannot account alone for what conduces to hap-
piness. Once this is obtained, Aristotle has what he 
needs to say that those opinions were correctly said 
but unclearly. By saying that pleasure, or wisdom or 
virtue leads to happiness, one means that they are 
alone what make life happy, since they are the goal 
which organizes one’s life. Aristotle showed that these 
goods alone do not lead to happiness, although they 
are necessary conditions to happiness. But this is ex-
cessively vague and insuciently informative, despite 
being true. 
$en, until EE I 5, Aristotle has shown that hap-
piness is the best life, oriented towards a goal which 
organizes one’s life, and that virtue, pleasure and wis-
dom are solidly regarded as necessary conditions to 
happiness. $is long argument, which starts in the 
very %rst chapter of the EE, supplies Aristotle with 
something to investigate upon, that is, an explanan-
dum. What he obtained by solving the EE I 3 aporia is 
that wisdom, virtue and pleasure belong to happiness. 
More accurately, he obtained that wisdom, virtue and 
pleasure belong to happiness as necessary conditions 
for it. Having this, Aristotle has something to enquire 
upon, that is, as he himself says in T1 (iv), something 
from which demonstration is possible. Aristotle, now, 
has to demonstrate the cause why wisdom, pleasure 
and virtue belong to happiness. Now, to investigate 
and to show the real cause (to dia ti) of something 
having certain properties mark o& the boundaries of 
philosophical (and scienti%c) enquiry (1216b35-40). 
$e philosopher, seeking the cause, must rely ulti-
mately on phainomena. Consistent arguments are not 
the decisive criteria to the ascription of truth-value to 
a proposition displayed in a syllogism’s conclusion. 
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A proposition featured in a syllogism’s conclusion 
might have been deduced by means of false premises 
and still be true, or yet being deduced by true prem-
ises which, however, do not relate to the conclusion as 
to show the appropriate cause of the conclusion (EE I 
6 1216b41-1217a10)22. To wit, the conclusion is true, 
but not for the cause it is deduced (EE I 6 1217a1417). 
Consequently, Aristotle seems to be claiming that in 
most philosophical enquiries, one should proceed on 
the grounds of making appeal to phainomena under-
stood as non-linguistic facts, since logoi by themselves 
do not guarantee that the propositions they consist of 
are true. If this is so, it %ts the picture quite well I am 
proposing here. 
Until EE I 6, Aristotle has shown that happiness, 
in fact, has wisdom, pleasure and virtue as its proper-
ties. Aristotle himself acknowledges that it is the case 
to seek out what exactly is the role that pleasure plays 
by being part of a happy life (EE I 5 1216a32-37). So, 
a*er showing that the Platonic Good and the common 
good are not achieved by action (EE I 7-8)23, Aristo-
tle brings back these properties to discussion. But, this 
time, he is concerned with approaching them as being 
in the soul, and this procedure is completely strange to 
the original opinions Aristotle departed from. At the 
beginning of EE they were taken as constituting hap-
piness, and nothing was said about them being in the 
soul. $is change in the argument can be understood 
within my interpretation, since Aristotle’s concern is 
now to show why wisdom, pleasure and virtue be-
long to happiness. Due to our construal of the exam of 
opinions from I 1-6, neither the aporia in I 3, nor the 
procedure in T1 seems to be in accordance with the 
dialectical construal of them. I shall now turn to A3.
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A1, by itself, is not sucient for one to claim that 
where ‘phainomena’ and ‘endoxa’ may be identi%ed 
as denoting the same set of propositions, then this 
context is dialectical. Even if A1 is true, what I think, 
considering Karbowski (2015), it is not, it needs A3, 
since A3 might guarantee that endoxa are the domain 
of dialectic and dialectic only. $e evidence for A3, 
however, is not compelling. In the Topics Aristotle 
does not con%ne endoxa within the boundaries of dia-
lectic24. $en, having endoxa as premises of dialectical 
syllogism does not entail that only dialectical syllo-
gisms use endoxa. Furthermore, another argumenta-
tive discipline conspicuously relies on endoxa, namely, 
the rhetoric25. So, why do interpreters tend to identify 
arguments relying on endoxa as dialectical instead of 
rhetorical26? My point is that there is no good prima 
facie reason to ascribe dialectical characteristics to an 
argument only because it relies on endoxa27. 
As it was stated above, a dialectical interpreter might 
agree with what I have just said about A3 and yet keep 
that T1 is dialectical because it proceeds in accordance 
with T2, whose method is dialectical. But this is now 
very problematic since Aristotle does not seem to have 
the same attitude towards endoxa in T1 as he allegedly 
had in T2. $en, the dialectic interpreter does not get 
any evidence either from A3 or from T2. 
A4 assumes that dialectic is a method of enquiry 
which consists of examining endoxa. It is true that 
dialectic examines endoxa, but it needs some quali-
%cation regarding it being a method of enquiry. It 
goes without saying that Aristotle wants to %nd, 
in the Topics, a method that enables one to argue 
through syllogisms about any matter and say nothing 
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inconsistent when she is put under questioning (Top. I 
1 100a 18-24). In order to accomplish what he wants, 
Aristotle needs to clarify what a syllogism is and to 
develop a set of argumentative skills which involves 
a theory of predication, some logical principles and 
argumentative tools (e.g. discovering premises, test-
ing homonymy, %nding di&erences, and investigating 
similarities28). If one knows them, one will be much 
better equipped to deal with several %elds where ar-
gumentative skills are required than someone who 
has no or little experience in arguing. $is situation is 
pretty much the same as when one, who has been edu-
cated in playing cello, starts to learn violin. She will be 
much better equipped to learn violin than someone 
who has never played any musical instrument. I think 
this is the case in Topics I 2, when Aristotle says that 
the treatise, not dialectic, is important to note (Top. I 
2 101a25-26), is useful for the exercises, encounters 
and philosophical sciences. If this is right, Aristotle 
is saying that the set of skills dealt with in the Top-
ics in order to equip someone to undertake a dialecti-
cal debate is also useful in other domains, philosophy 
included. In the same way as we would avoid saying 
that someone who can play cello, plays cello when is 
playing violin while using some common skill learned 
from her violin lessons, we should avoid saying that 
someone skilled in dialectic is doing dialectic when 
using argumentative skills common both to dialectic 
and philosophy while doing philosophy. In addition, it 
is not clear what a dialectical interpreter understands 
by ‘method of enquiry’. It is not an easy and a sim-
ple task to %nd in the Topics something like a number 
of articulate rules on how to proceed to investigate 
and produce knowledge about a subject-matter. Even 
if it is possible to say that Top. I 2 clearly states that 
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dialectic has the ability to examine, as we see in T3, 
and, then, dialectic is some sort of method, this abil-
ity is useful in relation to discovering or stablishing 
the %rst principles of sciences. In T1, as well as in T2, 
there is no principle being discovered or proven by 
the program there stated. 
Finally, A5 assumes that dialectic is useful at least 
as it can produce agreement, as it is capable of mak-
ing someone change her own mind. $is assumption 
strongly relies on the verb ‘metabibazomenoi’, in T1’s 
line 30, rendered as ‘to change minds’. $ere is ground 
to question whether this translation is the most ade-
quate one29. In fact, we do not %nd ‘to change minds’ 
as one of the meanings of this verb in Liddel&Scott; in 
this dictionary, we %nd ‘change the course of the argu-
ment’ instead. I don’t need to go deeper into this30. All I 
need is to highlight that the crucial passage in the Top-
ics where Aristotle mentions this kind of change cap-
tured by this verb, namely Top. I 2 101a 30-34, is ruled 
by the utilities of the treatise, not dialectic, regarding 
the encounters. As I mentioned beforehand, the Topics 
are useful for di&erent argumentative disciplines, since 
it deals with some logical and linguistic skills which 
are not con%ned within the boundaries of dialectic. So, 
even if we were sure Aristotle was using the skills and 
tools he elaborates in the Topics, we should not say that 
it is sucient to make T1 dialectical. 
If my construal is sound, Aristotle is not showing a 
dialectical attitude towards endoxa as it was expected 
in dialectic understood as conceptual analysis, and 
many assumptions the dialectical interpreter needs 
simply do not go through due to lack of evidence. My 
criticism of A1, A3, A4 and A5 is not limited to their 
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role in T1, as it can be applied to any case of enquiry 
taken as dialectical. As for A2, I am prone to arm 
that similar result is obtained if we carry out a close 
scrutiny of many of the allegedly dialectical arguments 
in Aristotle’s works. I hope that my arguments con-
tribute towards demystifying Aristotle’s conception 
of dialectic and his appeal to shared opinions, avoid-
ing an over-biased construal of dialectic as a powerful 
method for philosophy that operates by saving phain-
omena/endoxa31.
Notes
1  E.g. Irwin (1988), Bolton (1990), Ward (2008), Kraut 
(2006) and many others. I call this a revival because it gave dia-
lectic a new strength if compared to some positions held by in-
terpreters who, like Ross (1995), considered dialectic in quite a 
derogatory way. 
2  I will use the following abbreviations of Aristotle’s works: 
‘Top’ for ‘Topics’, ‘EE’ for ‘Eudemian Ethics’, and ‘EN’ for ‘Nico-
machean Ethics’. 
3  By ‘method of enquiry’ I mean an articulated body of pro-
cedures which direct an investigation of a certain sort. 
4  All quotations of the Topics are from Smith’s (1997) trans-
lation. 
5  Bostock (2000, p.215) says that this text sets out a method 
which might be fairly called ‘pure dialectic’.  
6  All quotations of the EE are from Woods (1992).
7  Bostock describes dialectical procedure of conceptual 
analysis along these lines: “$e method set out in VII.1 we may 
call the method of 'pure dialectic' When made fully explicit, it 
begins by stating what the relevant opinions are, and then stating 
what puzzles they give rise to. Subsequent discussion then aims 
to resolve these puzzles, and I shall understand the discussion as 
'purely dialectical' if the only technique employed is that of drawing 
distinctions which allow the needed quali%cations to he introduced, 
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so that the appearance of contradiction is dispelled. It may fairly 
be said that the discussion of akrasia in VII.1-10 illustrates this 
method very nicely.” (BOSTOCK, 2000, p.215-216 – emphasis is 
mine)
8  As my focus here is to challenge dialectical readings of T1, es-
pecially the one which consists in conceptual analysis, I will, for the 
sake of my argument, treat T2 as proposing a dialectical program 
of conceptual analysis. It does not mean that I committed to an in-
terpretation which takes T2 as in fact proposing such a program. I 
have dedicated myself to explain Aristotle’s conception of dialectic 
in Mendonça (2015). 
9  See Owen (1986). 
10  All quotations of the EN is from Rowe and Broadie (2002)
11  For instance: Ward (2008), Smith (1997) Irwin (1988)
12  I will consider only the opinions Aristotle mentions befo-
re EE I 6, but I acknowledge that the program Aristotle displays 
in T1 also applies to the opinions Aristotle refutes in EE I 7-8. 
13  Ward (2008, p.47), for example, resorts to this move. 
14  Aristotle says in the third passage where the mentioned 
verb appears: “For nothing prevents things that are not so from 
seeming more so to someone than the truth, so that if the ar-
gument comes about from what seems so to him he will more 
likely be convinced or bene%ted. And anyone who is to change 
minds [μεταβιβάζοντα] well must change [μεταβιβάζειν] them 
dialectically, not contentiously – as the geometer must do so 
geometrically – no matter whether the conclusion be false or 
true.” (Top. VIII 11 161a30-36)”
15  See Lesher (2010) for an account of what ‘saphēneia’ means. 
16  It is particularly a dicult problem for those interpreters 
who understand Aristotle to be proposing, as it were, degrees of 
endoxicality according to the acceptability of an opinion, that 
is, the more acceptable/accepted is an opinion, the more endo-
xical is its status (for an interpretation of this kind, see Bolton 
(1990)). If it is so, why does Aristotle dismiss the opinions held 
by most people as being irrelevant to ethical enquiry and, even-
tually, to any kind of enquiry?
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17  As Aristotle says in the EN I 4 1095a14-22, everybody 
agrees with this assumption however very general and insu-
ciently informative it is.
18  For interpreters who have defended this position, see, 
e.g. Cooper (2009), Zingano (2007).
19  EE I 5 1215b30-1216a10.
20  “If something is %ne, understanding it is %ne also; but 
still, in the case of virtue, the most valuable thing is not to have 
knowledge of it, but to know from what sources it arises. For 
what we wish is to be courageous, not to know what courage is; 
to be just, not to know what justice is; in the same way as (we 
wish) to be healthy rather than to know what being healthy is, 
and to be in a good state, rather than to know what it is to be in 
a good state.” (EE I 5 1216b 19-25)
21  “But %rst we must consider what living well consists in 
and how it is to be attained” (EE I 1 1214a14-15).
22  Deducing true conclusions from true premises which do 
not display the adequate cause of the conclusion was one proce-
dure used by sophists. See Angioni (2012) for accurate account 
of this kind of sophistic argument.
23  A good account of the relation between EE I 1-6 and the 
EE I 7-8 is found in Zillig (2014).
24  See: Top. I 1 100a 18-21; 100a29-30, b21-23.
25  See, e.g., Rhetoric I 2 1356b28-35.
26  Zillig (2014) shows some rhetorical features in EE I 1-6, 
even if his paper’s goal is not to cash out rhetorical aspects of EE.
27  I have dedicated to a long exam of this subject in Men-
donça (2014, 2015).
28  Aristotle presents and elaborates on these tools along 
chapters 13-16 in Top. I
29  See an alternative translation in Kenny (2011)
30  In Mendonça (2015) I have elaborate on this matter.
31  I am deeply indebted to Lucas Angioni and Raphael Zil-
lig for having organized conferences (in Campinas and Porto 
Alegre) where I could discuss earlier versions of this paper, and 
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for having discussed the method of EE I 6 with me many times. 
I am also indebted for many comments and questions I received 
from Felipe Weinmann, Wellington Almeida, Breno Zuppo-
linni, Daniel Nascimento, David Ebrey, and Ben Morisson. Last 
but not least, I am indebted to Christina Kane for having read a 
previous version of this text.
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